21 Mar Alaska Supreme & Appellate Court Headnotes from 3.20.2017
Feature Case: SEAN WRIGHT, APPELLANT, V. TAMATHA K. ANDING, HSA, ET AL, APPELLEES. Alaska Supreme Court
Plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim was properly dismissed by summary judgment because it was not brought within two years of the point in time when plaintiff knew or should have known he had a medical malpractice claim.
Civil law – Medical malpractice – Summary judgment – Statute of limitations
Alaska Supreme Court Headnotes
RONALD M. BURTON, APPELLANT, V. FOUNTAINHEAD DEVELOPMENT, INC., APPELLEE. Alaska Supreme Court
Even though defendant made two defamatory statements, it was not liable for the tort of defamation because plaintiff could not prove that the defamatory statements were the cause of plaintiff’s harm.
Civil law – Defamation
RONALD M. BURTON, APPELLANT, V. FOUNTAINHEAD DEVELOPMENT, INC., APPELLEE. Alaska Supreme Court
The trial court properly found the presence of conditional business privilege, and therefore there was no tortious interference with a prospective business relationship, because the defendant had a direct financial interest in a contract and its actions were motivated by its desire to protect this financial interest, not by animus, spite or malice.
Civil law – Tortious interference with a prospective business relationship – Conditional business privilege
RONALD M. BURTON, APPELLANT, V. FOUNTAINHEAD DEVELOPMENT, INC., APPELLEE. Alaska Supreme Court
The record does not show that the trial court clearly erred when it decided not to award punitive damages based on its finding that any evidence of reckless behavior did not meet the clear and convincing evidence standard.
Civil law – Damages – Punitive damages
RONALD M. BURTON, APPELLANT, V. FOUNTAINHEAD DEVELOPMENT, INC., APPELLEE. Alaska Supreme Court
In defamation cases, general damages are intended to compensate the plaintiff for reputational harm, not concrete financial losses, which are considered special damages.
Civil law – Damages – General damages
RONALD M. BURTON, APPELLANT, V. FOUNTAINHEAD DEVELOPMENT, INC., APPELLEE. Alaska Supreme Court
Because plaintiff could not prove that the defamatory statements were a substantial factor in his firing, he did not suffer special harm and therefore was properly denied special damages.
Civil law – Damages – Special damages
RONALD M. BURTON, APPELLANT, V. FOUNTAINHEAD DEVELOPMENT, INC., APPELLEE. Alaska Supreme Court
When reviewing a damages award following a bench trial, the proper standard of review shall be clear error, except with regards to questions of law.
Civil law – Standard of review
RONALD M. BURTON, APPELLANT, V. FOUNTAINHEAD DEVELOPMENT, INC., APPELLEE. Alaska Supreme Court
Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint to add an additional instance of defamation was properly dismissed because plaintiff’s attorney did not allege it was another instance of defamation at the time it was entered into evidence during the last day of trial.
Civil law – Amend pleadings
RONALD M. BURTON, APPELLANT, V. FOUNTAINHEAD DEVELOPMENT, INC., APPELLEE. Alaska Supreme Court
Parties may litigate additional issues not formally pled in the pleadings, as long as both sides consent to the additional issue. This consent may be implied, but only if the parties acknowledge that an issue not in pleadings will be added to one of the issues contested during trial.
Civil law – Trial by consent
JAMES E. BARBER, APPELLANT, V. STATE OF ALASKA, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, APPELLEE. Alaska Supreme Court
A superior court judge improperly dismissed prisoners’ motions for enforcement of the Cleary Final Settlement Agreement when he incorrectly concluded that the Cleary Final Settlement Agreement had been terminated by the Alaska Prison Litigation Reform Act. The Alaska Prison Litigation Reform Act did not terminate the Cleary Final Settlement Agreement, but instead only terminated any prospective effect it had.
Prison law – Cleary Final Settlement Agreement – Alaska Prison Litigation Reform Act
JAMES E. BARBER, APPELLANT, V. STATE OF ALASKA, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, APPELLEE. Alaska Supreme Court
Because a superior court judge’s order could have been appealed, but was not, it became the law of the case and was not subject to reconsideration unless exceptional circumstances showed the existence of a clear error resulting in manifest injustice.
Prison law – Law of the case doctrine
SEAN WRIGHT, APPELLANT, V. TAMATHA K. ANDING, HSA, ET AL, APPELLEES. Alaska Supreme Court
Despite the fact that the judge hearing plaintiff’s case at bar had presided over the plaintiff’s criminal case and was subject to a lawsuit initiated by the plaintiff, the judge properly dismissed plaintiff’s motion for disqualification filed against him because there was no evidence of a potential bias and no rule precluded the judge from hearing plaintiff’s case at bar.
Civil law – Judicial disqualification
SEAN WRIGHT, APPELLANT, V. TAMATHA K. ANDING, HSA, ET AL, APPELLEES. Alaska Supreme Court
Even though there were prior doctor’s notes recommending that plaintiff receive hearing aids, this did not create a genuine issue of material fact because it only went to the issue of whether hearing aids were medically necessary, not whether correctional officers deliberately disregarded an inmate’s health care needs.
Civil law – Deliberate indifference to medical need
SEAN WRIGHT, APPELLANT, V. TAMATHA K. ANDING, HSA, ET AL, APPELLEES. Alaska Supreme Court
Even though Alaska appellate courts have a policy against finding waiver of claims when the litigant is pro se and the waiver is unintentional, plaintiff’s remaining claims were deemed waived on appeal because they were not raised at the superior court level, were not included in plaintiff’s Statement of Points on Appeal, were not briefed on appeal and raised brand new issues never mentioned at any prior point in the litigation.
Civil law – Waiver
DENNIS O., APPELLANT, V. STEPHANIE O., APPELLEE. Alaska Supreme Court
When the opposing parent is represented by private counsel in a child custody case, refusing to provide court-appointed counsel to the indigent parent without an attorney is not a violation of due process of the Alaska Constitution because a child custody matter is not of the highest magnitude like a termination of parental rights matter is, the advantage the opposing parent with private counsel has does not rise to an unconstitutional level and the costs on the state for providing court-appointed counsel would outweigh its benefits.
Family law – Child custody – Indigent parents – Court-appointed counsel – Due process
DENNIS O., APPELLANT, V. STEPHANIE O., APPELLEE. Alaska Supreme Court
Appellant was not warranted court-appointed counsel because he was held to a more lenient standard by the family law master, opposing parent’s legal representation came from private counsel and not the state, child custody matters do not carry the risk of loss of parental rights and the state not providing court-appointed counsel was in the interests of the children.
Family law – Child custody – Court-appointed counsel – Mathews factors – Individual due process rights
DENNIS O., APPELLANT, V. STEPHANIE O., APPELLEE. Alaska Supreme Court
Because appellant was not entitled to court-appointed counsel in the child custody matter, there could be no violation of appellant’s equal protection rights under the Alaska Constitution.
Family law – Child custody – Equal protection – Court-appointed counsel
Alaska Court of Appeals Headnotes
STATE OF ALASKA, APPELLANT, V. JAMES R. SEIGLE, APPELLEE. Alaska Court of Appeals
The state’s position that the Alaska Court of Appeals’ Collins decision never took effect because it was immediately pending on appeal before the Alaska Supreme Court, was incorrect because any decision from the Court of Appeals remains law until superseded by the Alaska Supreme Court.
Stare decisis – Appellate procedure
STATE OF ALASKA, APPELLANT, V. JAMES R. SEIGLE, APPELLEE. Alaska Court of Appeals
Trial court did not err when it referred the sentencing phase of a case to a three-judge panel because the court decision the trial court relied on was still good law because it was merely pending before the Alaska Supreme Court and had not yet been overridden by the Alaska legislature.
Criminal law – Sentencing
STATE OF ALASKA, APPELLANT, V. JAMES R. SEIGLE, APPELLEE. Alaska Court of Appeals
Whenever a defendant claims that a sentence with a presumptive range would be manifestly unjust, the court must examine the totality of the circumstances, which requires consideration of the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation, the defendant’s background, prior criminal history, character and education.
Criminal law – Sentencing – Chaney criteria
STATE OF ALASKA, APPELLANT, V. JAMES R. SEIGLE, APPELLEE. Alaska Court of Appeals
A state’s right to appeal a sentence is limited by the double jeopardy clauses in the United States and Alaska Constitutions. Therefore, the Alaska Court of Appeals’ has no authority to increase the severity of defendant’s sentence and may only issue an advisory opinion.